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Abstract 
Australian governments claim to be committed to improving transparency and 
democratic accountability. Yet they are increasingly contracting out research to 
external consultants, ‘think tanks’ and universities and the contractual 
relationships formed can, in fact, promote secrecy and undermine the goals of 
transparency and public scrutiny of government actions. This article reports on a 
first-in-kind study of research contracts between Commonwealth and New South 
Wales Government entities and external providers. Our analysis reveals that 
‘control clauses’ are prevalent: contractually, governments can insist on the 
rights to determine whether, when and how the results of research are publicly 
disseminated, to claim intellectual property rights over work produced, and to 
terminate contractual relationships at will and without cause. These findings have 
troubling implications for government openness and accountability, for academic 
freedom when university researchers face restrictions on publication, and for 
evidence-informed policymaking. We propose solutions for proactive 
information disclosure to ensure that government transparency promises are 
realised in practice. We advocate for comprehensive public release of contract 
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Information is a valuable resource. The right information at the right time can 
expand knowledge, enable innovation, boost productivity, and even save 
lives. Unlike other valuable resources information is not diminished by use. 
Indeed, the value of information can be enhanced when it is openly accessible 
and reused frequently.1 
 
Missing or buried research represents a democratic deficit. It feeds cynicism 
and has no place in any honest and well-conducted administration.2 
 
It is a sad day when Australian researchers talk about suppression of scientific 
studies and their findings.3 
I Introduction 
A growing international movement seeks to advance openness and transparency in 
government activities. Globally, the Open Government Partnership program, of 
which Australia is a member, wants governments to become ‘more transparent, more 
accountable, and more responsive to their own citizens, with the ultimate goal of 
improving the quality of governance, as well as the quality of services that citizens 
receive’.4 In its first Open Government National Action Plan, released in December 
2016, the Government of Australia promised ‘ambitious action’ to improve: 
transparency, accountability and public sector integrity, especially in contracting 
practices; access to government information, including more open datasets; and 
meaningful public participation in policy development and delivery of services.5 In 
March 2017, the Government announced its adoption of the International Open Data 
Charter, a further commitment to improving openness and citizen engagement.6 
																																																								
1 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Cth), Understanding the Value of Public Sector 
Information in Australia: Issues Paper 2 (November 2011) 2 <http://apo.org.au/system/files/27576/ 
apo-nid27576-99411.pdf>. 
2 Nick Ross, ‘Foreword’ in Sir Stephen Sedley, Missing Evidence: An Inquiry into the Delayed 
Publication of Government-Commissioned Research (Sense about Science, June 2016) 
<https://researchinquiry.org/inquiry-report/> (‘Sedley Report’). 
3 Anne McKenzie et al ‘Response to “A Survey of Suppression of Public Health Information by 
Australian Governments”’ (2008) 32(1) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 90. 
4 Open Government Partnership, Improving Public Services: Guidance for Developing OGP Commitments, 
2 <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/OGP_public-service-guidance.pdf>. 
5 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), Australia’s First Open Government National 
Action Plan 2016–18 (December 2016) 3 <http://ogpau.pmc.gov.au/australias-first-open-
government-national-action-plan-2016-18>. Plans are underway for Australia’s Second Open 
Government National Action Plan 2018–20: <https://ogpau.pmc.gov.au/consultations-australias-
second-open-government-national-action-plan-2018-20>. 
6 Angus Taylor, Assistant Minister for Cities and Digital Transformation (Cth), ‘Australia’s Adoption 
of the Open Data Charter’ (Statement, 27 March 2017) cited by Samira Hassan, Australia Adopts the 
International Open Data Charter (7 April 2017) <https://blog.data.gov.au/news-media/blog/ 
australia-adopts-international-open-data-charter>. The Open Data Charter has six principles: (1) 
government data should be open by default; (2) access should be provided in a timely and 
comprehensive way; (3) data should be accessible and usable; (4) data should be comparable and 
interoperable; (5) open data should improve governance and citizen engagement; (6) open data 
should support inclusive development and innovation: Open Data Charter Principles 
<https://opendatacharter.net/principles/>. 
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While making these commitments to transparency and access to public sector 
information, governments are increasingly contracting out the provision of research 
to external entities, including ‘think tanks’, private sector consultants and university-
based researchers.7 This trend to external procurement is rooted in the ‘New Public 
Management’ movement, which champions the values of competition and efficiency 
and aims to reduce the size of government through privatisation and the outsourcing 
of activities previously seen as the natural domain of government.8 
The processes by which governments outsource research and advisory 
services can, in practice, promote secrecy and undermine the goals of transparency 
and public scrutiny of government actions. A key mechanism of control is the 
contract that establishes the terms of the relationship between the government 
purchaser and the external provider of research. Contractually, governments can 
insist on the rights to control whether, when and how the results of research are 
publicly disseminated, to claim intellectual property (‘IP’) rights over work 
produced, and to terminate contractual relationships at will and without cause. 
Worryingly, these types of contractual clauses — described here as ‘control clauses’ 
— can limit the degree to which government-purchased research is exposed to 
external scrutiny and, in turn, diminish the rigour and quality of research.9 It can also 
contribute to duplication of effort and wasteful spending if bureaucrats, unaware of 
previous contract research that never saw the light of day, go to market again to 
purchase similar work.10 
This article reports on our investigation into control clauses in health-related 
research contracts between Commonwealth and New South Wales (‘NSW’) 
government entities and external providers. We selected health as the focus of this 
investigation because health expenditure comprises a substantial portion of 
government spending — over $180 billion in 2016/1711 — and openness about the 
																																																								
7 Ariadne Vromen and Patrick Hurley, ‘Consultants, Think Tanks and Public Policy’ in Brian Head 
and Kate Crowley (eds) Policy Analysis in Australia (Policy Press, 2015) 167. See also Arnošt 
Veselý, ‘Externalization of Policy Advice: Theory, Methodology and Evidence’ (2013) 32(3) Policy 
and Society 199, 206 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.07.002>. Veselý hypothesises three 
broad reasons for outsourcing: (1) lack of internal capacity; (2) political factors; and (3) the context 
in which the policy advice is provided. 
8 Brian Head et al, ‘Are Policy-Makers Interested in Social Research? Exploring the Sources and Uses 
of Valued Information among Public Servants in Australia’ (2014) 33(2) Policy and Society 89. For 
commentary on the development of the New Public Management movement from the Hawke 
Government in the mid-1980s, see Judy Johnston, ‘The New Public Management in Australia’ (2000) 
22(2) Administrative Theory and Praxis 345. 
9 Schneider, Milat and Moore report the concern that if results will not be published, the ‘quality of 
evaluations was generally lower due to the absence of expectations of public scrutiny’: Carmen 
Huckel Schneider, Andrew J Milat and Gabriel Moore, ‘Barriers and Facilitators to Evaluation of 
Health Policies and Programs: Policymaker and Researcher Perspectives’ (2016) 58 Evaluation and 
Program Planning 208, 211–12.  
10 A 2017 Productivity Commission Report on access to public sector data points out: ‘The lack of 
public release and data sharing between government entities has contributed to fragmentation and 
duplication of data collection activities. This … wastes public and private sector resources’: 
Productivity Commission (Cth), Data Availability and Use: Productivity Commission Inquiry 
(Report No 82, March 2017) 34, 153 (Finding 3.5) <http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/data-
access/report/data-access.pdf>. 
11 Australian Institute of Health and Welfare (Cth), Health Expenditure Australia 2016–17  
(28 September 2018) <https://www.aihw.gov.au/reports/health-welfare-expenditure/health-expenditure 
-australia-2016-17/contents/data-visualisation>. 
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research informing health policies and programs is vital.12 Our research contributes 
an applied, ‘law-in-action’ perspective to transparency discourse.13 We adopt a 
broad conceptualisation of transparency as the availability of information about an 
entity that allows external parties to monitor its internal actvities or performance.14 
Information availability can be achieved through active transparency, which requires 
governments to proactively release information to the public, or through passive 
means, such as freedom-of-information (‘FOI’) laws that allow people to request 
access to government-held records.15 
This article has four main parts. First, we set the context by summarising the 
origins of the ‘open government’ movement, briefly describing three main 
government funding sources for health research, and highlighting previous reports 
of government control over contract research. Second, we present our investigation 
of Commonwealth and NSW contracts, which reveals that the use of control clauses 
is routine. Third, we make recommendations to improve government transparency. 
We advocate for the full disclosure of contracts on public registers and urge 
governments, in consultation with key stakeholders, to review and update standard 
contractual terms dealing with publication, IP and termination, to ensure they 
advance transparency goals. In doing so, the unique role of universities in society 
must be respected. We also call on governments to publish reports of contract 
research. Finally, we conclude with an agenda for further research. 
II The Context 
A The Open Government Movement 
Australia’s 2016 Open Government Plan has its origins in the Government 2.0 
movement instigated nearly a decade ago.16 In 2009, a taskforce was established to 
advise the Australian Government on matters that included improving transparency, 
enhancing the accessibility of government information, and establishing a ‘pro-
disclosure culture.’17 The Taskforce’s central recommendation was that the 
Australian Government should make a declaration of open government.18 Further, 
																																																								
12 In addition, the investigators’ own areas of research expertise are in health-related fields, which 
strengthened our ability to select and review government contracts. 
13 Christopher Hood and David Heald (eds), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? (Oxford 
University Press, 2006). 
14 Stephan Grimmelikhuijsen Transparency and Trust: An Experimental Study of Online Disclosure 
and Trust in Government (PhD thesis, Utrecht University, 2012) 55. See also Stephan G 
Grimmelikhuijsen and Eric W Welch, ‘Developing and Testing a Theoretical Framework for 
Computer-Mediated Transparency of Local Governments’ (2012) 72(4) Public Administration 
Review 562. 
15 Vincent Mabillard and Raphael Zumofen, ‘The Complex Relationships between Transparency and 
Accountability: A Synthesis and Contribution to Existing Frameworks’ (2017) 32(2) Public Policy 
and Administration 110.  
16 Department of Finance (Cth), Government 2.0 <https://www.finance.gov.au/archive/policy-guides-
procurement/gov20/>. 
17 Government 2.0 Taskforce, Engage: Getting on with Government 2.0: Report of the Government 2.0 
Taskforce (December 2009) 88 <https://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/Government20Taskforce 
Report.pdf?> (‘Government 2.0 Taskforce Report’). 
18 Ibid xvii, 22.  
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to achieve greater openness, the Government should adopt a default position that 
public sector information19 will be freely accessible and should implement a 
consistent framework to support publication of government information.20 The 
Government followed through with a Declaration of Open Government in mid-2010 
and established the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner.21 The 
Commissioner subsequently promulgated the ‘Principles on Open Public Sector 
Information’, asserting the primary principle that government-held information 
should be publicly available unless there is a legal reason for confidentiality: 
‘Information held by Australian Government agencies is a valuable national 
resource. If there is no legal need to protect the information it should be open to 
public access. Information publication enhances public access.’22 
Pledges to improve government openness coincide with the evidence-based 
policymaking movement, which is championed within the public sector and by 
external advisors.23 In a critical analysis of evidence-based policymaking, Head 
observed that ‘it is axiomatic that reliable information and expert knowledge are 
integral to sound processes for formulating and implementing policy’.24 
Governments should not only be rigorous in their decision-making, but also be open 
about the sources and types of evidence used to inform their legislation, policies and 
practices. Policymaking is not simply a technocratic process of translating evidence 
into policy. It is, by definition, political and influenced by ideology.25 This fact 
underscores the need for governments to be transparent about the evidence that has 
informed policy decisions. As Hawkins and Parkhurst argue, ‘[t]he policies 
[governments] adopt, the evidence they marshal to support their decisions and the 
																																																								
19 The Taskforce adopted an Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (‘OECD’) 
definition of public sector information: ‘information, including information products and services, 
generated, created, collected, processed, preserved, maintained, disseminated, or funded by or for the 
government or public institutions, taking into account [relevant] legal requirements and restrictions’: 
ibid 4 [1.4]. See also OECD, OECD Recommendation of the Council for Enhanced Access and More 
Effective Use of Public Sector Information, C(2008)36 (17–18 June 2008) 4 n 1 <http://www.oecd.org/ 
internet/ieconomy/40826024.pdf>. 
20 Government 2.0 Taskforce Report, above n 17, xix, xxi (Recommendations 6, 8). 
21 Department of Finance (Cth), Declaration of Open Government (July 2010) <https://www.finance. 
gov.au/blog/2010/07/16/declaration-open-government/>. 
22 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Cth), Principles on Open Public Sector 
Information, principle 1 <https://www.oaic.gov.au/information-policy/information-policy-resources/ 
principles-on-open-public-sector-information>. Greater openness is also championed at state and 
territorial levels. For example, the NSW Office of the Premier and Cabinet issued a Memorandum of 
Open Government in 2012 that expressed its commitment ‘to the open government principles of 
transparency, participation, collaboration and innovation’ (emphasis in original): Barry O’Farrell 
(Premier), M2012-10 Open Government (22 August 2012) Office of the Premier and Cabinet (NSW) 
<http://arp.nsw.gov.au/m2012-10-open-government>. The Victorian Department of Premier and 
Cabinet champions these open government principles since they ‘underpin the good government 
agenda’: Chris Eccles, ‘The “Open Government” Principles of Transparency, Collaboration  
and Participation Underpin the Good Government Agenda’ (Speech delivered at the  
ANZSOG Conference, Grand Hyatt, Melbourne, 5 August 2015) <http://www.vic.gov.au/ 
publicsectorreform/speeches/does-open-government-make-for-good-government.html>. 
23 See, eg, Productivity Commission (Cth), Strengthening Evidence-Based Policy in the Australian 
Federation: Roundtable Proceedings, vol 1, 9 <http://www.pc.gov.au/research/supporting/ 
strengthening-evidence>. 
24 Brian W Head, ‘Toward More “Evidence-Informed” Policy Making?’ (2015) 76(3) Public 
Administration Review 472, 472 (citation omitted). 
25 Ibid. 
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interpretation of that evidence should be transparent, and thus open to contestation 
by policy actors and citizens.’26 Governments should also be open about the findings 
of program and policy evaluations so that members of the public can learn whether 
or not government initiatives have met their stated aims, at what costs, and whether 
they have had unexpected impacts.  
B Government Funding for Health Research 
In Australia, government-funded health research can be classified into three types. 
First, government agencies use internal research conducted by public servants. This 
capacity has diminished substantially in recent decades and research work is 
increasingly outsourced.27 Second, governments invest public funds through 
agencies whose primary purpose is to support research, principally the National 
Health and Medical Research Council (‘NHMRC’) and the Australian Research 
Council (‘ARC’). Such research mostly occurs in universities and medical research 
institutes, to generate new knowledge from basic science, clinical, public health, and 
health services research. In this category, researchers propose projects that go 
through competitive peer review processes. Government is at arms-length from the 
research, typically not seeking to control its conduct or the reporting of findings, and 
making no claim on the IP generated.28 Moreover, researchers conduct this work 
within universities that have statutory obligations to undertake research in the public 
interest, advance knowledge, and promote critical and free inquiry.29 
The third category of government-funded health research, and the focus of 
our study, involves government agencies issuing tenders to purchase research from 
external providers in order to answer questions relating to their policy and program 
development, implementation or evaluation. Successful bidders may be universities, 
medical research institutes and private or quasi-private bodies, including research 
organisations that are spin-offs from universities and incorporated business entities. 
The extent of this type of research expenditure is unknown, but likely to be 
substantial given the large numbers of calls for tenders announced on the 
Commonwealth AusTender site30 and each of its state counterparts.31 In our pilot 
research, we identified hundreds of projects advertised on these sites with values 
ranging from tens to hundreds of thousands of dollars per project. The nature of the 
																																																								
26 Benjamin Hawkins and Justin Parkhurst, ‘The “Good Governance” of Evidence in Health Policy’ 
(2015) 12(4) Evidence and Policy 575, 582 (emphasis altered).  
27 Veselý, above n 7; Vromen and Hurley, above n 7. 
28 Both ARC and NHMRC have adopted the ‘National Principles of Intellectual Property Management 
for Publicly Funded Research’: see NHMRC, National Principles of Intellectual Property 
Management for Publicly Funded Research (7 June 2018) 2(c) <https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/grants-
funding/policy/intellectual-property-management/national-principles-intellectual-property-man>. 
29 See, eg, University of Sydney Act 1989 (NSW) s 6(2)(b); University of Melbourne Act 2009 (Vic) 
s 5(e)(iii); Australian National University Act 1991 (Cth) s 5(1)(a). 
30 Australian Government, ausTENDER <https://www.tenders.gov.au/>. 
31 See, eg, NSW Government, eTendering <https://tenders.nsw.gov.au/>; State Government of Victoria, 
Tenders VIC <https://www.tenders.vic.gov.au>. Australia is not alone in the absence of clear 
quantification of government spending on externally-purchased research. The 2016 Sedley Report 
noted that ‘[t]he United Kingdom government spends about £2.5 billion a year on research intended 
to guide, develop, modify and monitor policy on a wide variety of issues’, however ‘[i]t is difficult to 
tell how much of this was spent on commissioned research.’: Sedley Report, above n 2, 1–2. 
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relationship formed between government and provider is usually different to that in 
researcher-initiated projects and the mechanisms for promoting research integrity 
and transparency are far less straightforward. In contract research, the government 
purchaser may be involved in the framing of research questions, specification of 
study design, choice of methods, interpretation of results, preparation of reports, 
and/or the dissemination of findings. The government might require researchers to 
turn over IP to government and publish results only with its approval, and work may 
occur under threat that the funder can terminate contracts at will. 
C Concern about Government Control over Externally 
Commissioned Research 
Political scientists and policy scholars have, for some time, studied who is supplying 
research and advice to governments and the scope of government control over the 
internal and external sources of expertise.32 They have developed the concept of a 
policy advisory system to refer to ‘the interlocking sets of actors and organizations, 
with a unique configuration in each sector and jurisdiction, that provides 
recommendations for action to policy-makers’.33 For example, a policy analyst 
employed in the public service performs research and provides briefings and advice, 
but must do so within the boundaries of her or his employment relationship and 
assigned work duties. Entities established by Acts of Parliament can have statutorily-
defined advisory roles and legislative protections can minimise the degree of control 
exerted by the government. External to government, a range of individuals and 
organisations can provide input and advice to government, with government exerting 
no control over some and potentially high levels of control over others. For instance, 
governments do not control the advice offered by independently funded interest 
groups that make submissions as part of law reform inquiries. In contrast, consultants 
and researchers retained by government are controlled by the terms and conditions 
of their contractual arrangements. 
Australian social scientists have made the case for an urgent need to 
investigate how governments procure and use research to inform policy, enabling a 
view of ‘the inner workings of the policy “black box”’.34 No published research 
examines Australian governments’ use of control clauses in research purchased 
through tenders — a gap addressed by our research. However, a previous survey and 
a case study reveal evidence of government control over the public dissemination of 
contract research. In a 2006 survey of approximately 300 public health academics in 
Australia, Yazahmeidi and Holman found that 21% of the respondents reported 
having personally experienced a ‘suppression event’ in the preceding 5.5 years. A 
suppression event is where a government funder had invoked a clause in the contract 
																																																								
32 John Halligan, ‘Policy Advice and the Public Service’ in B Guy Peters and Donald J Savoie (eds), 
Governance in a Changing Environment (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1995) 138. 
33 Jonathan Craft and Matt Wilder, ‘Catching a Second Wave: Context and Compatibility in Advisory 
System Dynamics’ (2017) 45(1) Policy Studies Journal 215, 215 <https://doi.org/10.1111/ 
psj.12133>. 
34 Head et al, above n 8, 90. 
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to ‘sanitize’, ‘delay’ or ‘prohibit’ the publication of findings.35 According to the 
survey respondents, their work was targeted because it ‘drew attention to failings in 
health services (48%), the health status of a vulnerable group (26%), or pointed to a 
harm in the environment (11%)’.36 These findings backed perceptions of a growing 
tendency among government agencies to control the conduct and reporting of policy-
relevant research.37 A case study of an Australian contract negotiation in 2012 raised 
concerns about control clauses in health research contracts, including provisions that 
vest IP rights in the Government and allow the Government to limit publication of 
results and terminate contracts without cause.38 
Other sources reveal related problems that undermine the goals of 
transparency and open government. In Australia, a coalition of major research-
intensive universities, the Group of Eight (‘Go8’), was candid in its concerns about 
research contracts in a 2008 submission to the Review of the National Innovation 
System:  
the standard terms sought by the Commonwealth when entering into research 
agreements with universities misunderstand the role and nature of 
universities; are unnecessarily onerous and impractical; often cause delay and 
uncertainty due to their complexity; and serve to stifle knowledge transfer and 
innovation by restricting the capacity of universities to disseminate the results 
of the sponsored research for public benefit.39 
Successive Australian National Audit Office (‘ANAO’) reviews find misuses 
of confidentiality clauses in a range of government contracts notwithstanding a 2001 
Senate Order that confidentiality provisions should not restrict public access to 
contract information unless there is a strong justification for non-disclosure.40 A 
recent audit ‘found that processes to capture information about basic contract details 
and the reporting of confidentiality provisions were inadequate. Only 19 per cent of 
contracts sampled were accurately reported in AusTender.’41 
Internationally, a British charity, Sense about Science, is doing 
groundbreaking work investigating government practices in delaying and 
withholding commissioned and internal research findings.42 The United Kingdom 
(‘UK’) is ahead of Australia in its open government initiatives — it is already into a 
																																																								
35 Boshra Yazahmeidi and C D’Arcy Holman, ‘A Survey of Suppression of Public Health Information 
by Australian Governments’ (2007) 31(6) Australian and New Zealand Journal of Public Health 
551, 552–3 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1753-6405.2007.00142.x>. 
36 Ibid 551. See also 553, 555. 
37 C D’Arcy J Holman, ‘An End to Suppressing Public Health Information’ (2008) 188(8) Medical 
Journal of Australia 435. 
38 Kypros Kypri, ‘Suppression Clauses in University Health Research: Case Study of an Australian 
Government Contract Negotiation’ (2015) 203(2) Medical Journal of Australia 72. 
39 Go8, In the Interests of Innovation: Time for a New Approach to Negotiating Research Agreements 
between the Commonwealth and Australian Universities: A Supplementary Submission from the 
Group of Eight to the Review of the National Innovation System (April 2008) 1 
<https://go8.edu.au/sites/default/files/docs/go8_innovation_review_supp_sub_300408.pdf>. 
40 ANAO, ‘Confidentiality in Government Contracts: Senate Order for Entity Contracts (Calendar Year 
2015 Compliance)’ (ANAO Report No 18 of 2016–2017, 27 September 2016) 7 [5] 
<https://www.anao.gov.au/work/performance-audit/confidentiality-government-contracts-senate-
order-2015>. 
41 Ibid 8 [5].  
42 See Sedley Report, above n 2.  
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third phase of its National Action Plan on Open Government43 and has been ranked 
as a global leader in government transparency.44 Several high-level protocols from 
the UK Government Office for Science and the Government Economics and Social 
Research Team require ‘prompt and complete publication of research conducted or 
commissioned by’ government departments.45 Yet, the Sedley Report arising from a 
2016 inquiry, sponsored by Sense about Science and led by a former Court of Appeal 
judge, revealed that governmental bodies routinely conceal externally commissioned 
research from public view. Suppression is deliberate in some cases where research 
results are considered politically inconvenient or embarrassing.46 In other cases, 
benign neglect seems to be the problem, where departments lack processes to keep 
track of research they have commissioned and therefore fail to make it public. The 
Sedley Report endorsed the principle that ‘[p]rompt and full publication of 
government research is a matter not of contract but of public duty. While research 
contracts will necessarily vary in their provisions, all contracts should spell out this 
obligation of principle’,47 which would advance government commitments to 
openness and transparency. 
III An Investigation of Commonwealth and NSW 
Contracts 
Our pilot study, undertaken in 2015–16, examined a sample of Commonwealth and 
NSW contracts.48 We sought to identify the presence and content of three types of 
contractual control clauses; namely, clauses dealing with: (a) contract termination 
rights; (b) ownership of IP; and (c) control of publication. Through an analysis of 
draft and executed contracts, we sought to determine whether control clauses are 
modified or removed in the negotiation process between the government and the 
successful bidder.  
																																																								
43 Cabinet Office (UK), ‘UK Open Government National Action Plan 2016–18’ (Policy Paper, 12 May 
2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-open-government-national-action-plan-2016-
18/uk-open-government-national-action-plan-2016-18>. 
44 World Wide Web Foundation, WebIndex <http://thewebindex.org>. The Productivity Commission 
points out that ‘Australia’s provision of open access to public sector data is below comparable 
countries with similar governance structures, including the United States, the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand.’: Productivity Commission, above n 10, 33, 76 (Finding 1.1). 
45 Sedley Report, above n 2, 8–9 [2.20]–[2.26]. See also Government Office for Science (UK), 
‘Principles of Scientific Advice to Government’ (Guidance Paper, 24 March 2010) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-advice-to-government-principles/principles- 
of-scientific-advice-to-government>; Government Office for Science (UK), ‘The Government Chief 
Scientific Adviser’s Guidelines on the Use of Scientific and Engineering Advice in Policy Making’ 
(Guidance Paper, 1 July 2010) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/scientific-and-
engineering-advice-guidelines-for-policy-makers>; Government Economic and Social Research 
Team, HM Treasury (UK), Publishing Research and Analysis in Government: GSR Publication 
Protocol (May 2015) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/ 
file/431367/GSR_publication_protocol_2015_FINAL.pdf>. 
46 Sedley Report, above n 2, 16. The Inquiry looked into nine case studies of research reports being 
withheld: see Sense about Science, Case Studies <https://researchinquiry.org/case-studies/>. 
47 Sedley Report, above n 2, 34 [4.22]. 
48 The study was approved by the University of Newcastle Human Research Ethics Committee 
(approval number H-2015-0188). 
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A Method 
We accessed the Commonwealth tender website (https://www.tenders.gov.au) and 
the NSW tender website (https://tenders.nsw.gov.au/) between March and 
November 2015. These websites list project descriptions and typically provide a 
draft, pro forma contract to indicate the expected terms of the relationship between 
the government and a successful bidder.49 We searched for tenders for research and 
evaluation projects, focused principally on health-related topics. Due to the volume 
of tenders, we limited the Commonwealth search to tenders issued through the 
Department of Health. For NSW, we included the Ministries of Health, Justice, 
Education, Family and Community Services, as well as WorkCover and the Motor 
Accidents Authority. 
A research assistant with an undergraduate law degree produced an initial list 
of potentially relevant tenders produced using broad search terms of ‘research’ and 
‘evaluation’ (‘health’ was added as a search term for the NSW tender website). The 
lead investigators reviewed the list and selected tenders calling for research to inform 
proposed government initiatives or to evaluate existing health-related programs. For 
example, the Commonwealth tenders included a call for an evaluation of a national 
primary health care strategy, as well as a tender for a research study to investigate 
how flavourings in tobacco products affect smoking behaviours, both of which we 
included. We excluded tenders that sought contractors to design research 
instruments (for example, a survey), carry out health surveillance or monitoring 
programs, or deliver health programs. On the tender websites we were able to search 
for awarded contracts to identify the successful bidder. We sought to maximise the 
heterogeneity in the funding agreements we studied in order to permit a variety of 
comparisons. Accordingly, we included contracts with different types of research 
providers, including universities, university-owned research entities, and private 
sector entities. We avoided selection bias by remaining blind to the content of the 
draft funding agreement when choosing the cases to study. We hypothesised that 
university-based researchers might be more likely to negotiate to modify or 
eliminate contractual clauses that restrict the ability to publish their work. Such 
control clauses might be of less concern to private sector providers. 
We accessed draft contracts that were available on the tender websites and 
made formal requests to the Australian Government Department of Health and NSW 
Government entities for executed contracts. These requests were made under the 
Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (‘FOI Act’) and the Government Information 
(Public Access) Act 2009 (NSW) (‘GIPA Act’). In requesting the contracts, we 
explained we were interested in the specific types of clauses noted above. We made 
it clear that we were not seeking access to details protected under the FOI Act or the 
GIPA Act, including information that could harm the commercial interests of a 
service provider (such as details of a novel research method) or the privacy of 
individual researchers. 
																																																								
49 A scan of tender websites in other states revealed inconsistent practices. In Western Australia (‘WA’), 
for example, draft contracts are not available on the WA Tender website: WA Government, Tenders 
WA <www.tenders.wa.gov.au>. In Queensland, draft contracts are not accessible for closed and 
archived tenders: Queensland Government, QTenders <https://www.hpw.qld.gov.au/qtenders/>. 
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We had a modest budget of $1200 from a University of Newcastle internal 
grant to cover fees, which allowed us to obtain contract documents for 21 tenders 
issued by NSW government bodies and six tenders from the Australian Government 
Department of Health.50 One NSW government body disclosed draft contract pro 
formas to us, which were already publicly available on the tender website, but 
refused to disclose the final contracts on the grounds that ‘these matters are still 
ongoing and the funding agreements have not yet been executed or grants have been 
awarded but the projects are not yet completed’.51 We were informed that the ‘final 
executed agreements rarely vary from the standard clauses in the [pro forma 
contracts]’.52 Two NSW tenders resulted in contracts with several different 
providers. In total, our contract analysis covers 35 projects. 
B Results 
A major finding of our investigation is that one or more types of control clause are 
present in all the draft and executed contracts we accessed. This reveals that the 
contractual relationships between government purchasers and external research 
providers are weighted in favour of government control and permit conduct that is 
contrary to transparency commitments. A comprehensive summary of the contract 
documents we analysed and the sources for all quotations reproduced from contracts 
is on file with the authors and available on request. 
1 Termination for Convenience 
From a transparency perspective, termination-for-convenience clauses are 
problematic as they give broad power to the government purchaser to end a contract 
simply on notice and not for cause. For example, a government agency may want 
the right to end the contract in case the timing of the planned study becomes 
politically inconvenient or because embarrassing or unfavourable research results 
start to emerge. A new government may also choose to terminate contracts awarded 
by its predecessor. 
In the contracts we reviewed, clauses that allow the government to terminate 
a contract without cause or explanation and simply by giving written notice are most 
common and rarely negotiated out.53 All draft and final Commonwealth contracts 
contain clauses giving the Government ‘unfettered discretion’ to terminate the 
contract for convenience, which means that it expressly rejects any requirement to 
exercise the termination power in good faith.54 
																																																								
50 Government departments may charge for processing FOI requests; eg, the current NSW fee is $30 
per hour: Department of Justice (NSW) Access to Information <https://www.justice.nsw.gov.au/ 
contact-us/access-to-information>. 
51 Notice of Decision Letter from NSW WorkCover to Shelby Houghton, 17 September 2015 (copy on 
file with authors). 
52 Ibid. 
53 Termination for cause was also covered in many contracts, but we do not summarise those provisions 
here as cause-based termination (eg, due to non-performance of agreed activities) does not 
compromise government transparency goals. 
54 The standard Commonwealth contract states that the Government agrees to pay for any services 
properly rendered up to the termination date and any reasonable and unavoidable costs to the contractor 
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Of all the contracts we obtained, just three NSW contracts do not have 
termination-for-convenience clauses and only permit termination for cause.55 In two 
cases, a draft contract gives the Government sole discretion to terminate for 
convenience, however the final contract gives the providers the same power of 
termination.56 This implies that the providers negotiated the right to end the contract 
simply by giving a specific period of notice. However, this does nothing to minimise 
the risk of the purchaser ending the contract at its discretion. The financial benefit 
gained from the contract means that it would rarely be convenient for the provider 
to act on a right to end the contract. 
2 Intellectual Property 
Contractual terms governing the ownership and use of IP have transparency 
implications as they can either restrict or promote the public dissemination of 
research outcomes. The contracts we analysed typically had clauses dealing with the 
existing IP that parties bring to the contract (which remains their own) and the new 
IP created during the course of conducting the research or evaluation study. 
All the Commonwealth draft contracts vested IP in the ‘contract materials’ in 
the Government, which encompasses all materials created for the purposes of the 
contract, including final reports. By owning the IP, the Government has the right to 
control the public release of contract deliverables. As a result, the pro formas do not 
have clauses concerning publication. However, as discussed below, all the final 
contracts incorporated specific terms on public dissemination through journal 
articles, conference presentations and other means. In one final contract, the 
university provider negotiated a licence to use the contract material, however the 
contractual terms required that draft and final reports be reviewed by the 
Government, thus providing an opportunity to the purchaser to shape how the 
findings are presented. 
In NSW, a majority of the draft contracts stated that the IP in materials 
produced from the contract vested in the Government and this ownership is rarely 
modified in the final contracts. Several draft contracts included a licensing provision 
that allows the provider to use the IP in the materials for its non-commercial teaching 
and research purposes; this type of licence is sometimes negotiated into the final 
contract. For three projects, the providers negotiated specific wording in the IP 
licencing clause to cover use and adaptation for publications. Of these, one contract 
allows publications  
																																																								
arising from the termination. There is uncertainty in Australian jurisprudence about implied contractual 
duties of good faith. The High Court of Australia has not accepted an implied good faith term in 
termination-for-convenience clauses. However, even if such a requirement were implied, it can be 
explicitly removed through wording that permits an unfettered right to terminate the contract. For 
discussion of termination-for-convenience clauses, see Ruth Loveranes, ‘“Termination for 
Convenience” Clauses’ (2012) 14 University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 103.  
55 These were NSW Department of Health contracts issued in 2013 to a small and a large private 
consultancy and a medical research institute.  
56 These were contracts between the NSW Department of Education with a university (2012) and the 
NSW Department of Family and Community Services with a non-governmental organisation (2014). 
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only after the completion of the Project and the provision of the final reports, 
issues papers and other deliverables under this Agreement, and … only after 
the Ministry has officially released or published the results of the Project, OR 
a period of 18 months has elapsed following provision of the final reports, 
issues papers and other deliverables under this Agreement …57 
Three tender contracts from one NSW Ministry provide for IP to be owned 
jointly between the Government and the service provider.58 The tender guidelines 
from another entity provide that ‘[a] fair and equitable agreement as to the rights of 
respective parties to the intellectual property created as a result of the funded project 
will be negotiated with successful applicants on a case by case basis’ and the 
Government intends that the provider ‘will have the full right to publish any results 
obtained by them’ for academic purposes through an appropriate IP licence.59 
Just one final contract vests IP rights in the university provider with a licence 
granted to the Government to use and exploit the contract materials for its 
purposes.60 
3 Control of Publication and Dissemination of Results 
Contractual terms governing whether, how and when research results can be 
disseminated publicly, especially through written publications, have important 
transparency implications. At one extreme, contracts can allow the government 
purchaser to exert complete control, for example, by stipulating that research 
outcomes may only be disseminated following formal processes of government 
review and approval. At the other extreme, the research provider may have full 
discretion to disseminate results, including through oral presentations and written 
publications, without any requirement of prior government review or approval. As a 
middle ground, the contract may oblige the external researcher to submit a draft 
report for informal feedback from a government representative, but with no 
obligation to comply with the government’s preferred wording or timing in the 
dissemination of results. Contracts may specifically require or expect the external 
provider to produce reports for publication in peer-reviewed journals. This is 
beneficial in ensuring that purchased research is subject to independent, expert 
review and makes a contribution beyond government in the advancement and 
dissemination of new knowledge. This benefit is undermined, however, if 
governments have the contractual power to direct how the results are expressed. 
Compared to the clauses dealing with contract termination and IP, we found 
the greatest degree of variation between draft and final contracts in their provisions 
dealing with the publication of results. This indicates that government purchasers 
and external research providers engage in more negotiation about this aspect of their 
contractual relationships than concerning contract termination and IP. 
																																																								
57 NSW Department of Health contract with a university (2013).  
58 NSW Department of Family and Community Services (2009; 2012; 2014).  
59 NSW Workcover (2014).  
60 NSW Department of Health contract with a university (2015).  
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As noted above, in the Commonwealth contracts, the ownership of IP permits 
government control over the publication of outputs. All the final contracts expand 
on how publication will be handled and require the research provider to submit draft 
materials for government review. In all but one case, the Government has the right 
to approve the final version. One contract with a university stated simply that the 
‘draft report must be presented to the Department for comment prior to the final 
version being completed’.61 A contract for a research project involving a literature 
review stipulates that the research organisation cannot publish the review without 
the Government’s written approval.62 Other contracts require the researcher to 
submit interim and final reports to the Department of Health for review, make 
revisions as requested, and obtain approval before sharing reports with any other 
party.63 Another project, a partnership between an Australian Government health 
commission and a university, requires as a project outcome the publication of results 
and methodologies in peer-reviewed journals.64 Draft publications require the 
Commission’s approval:  
Prior to submission of the articles to journals, the Contractor will provide the 
articles to the Commission for review and approval. In the event of a dispute 
about a draft journal article, the Advisory Group will be asked to provide a 
final opinion.65 
According to the contract, this Advisory Group is a body organised by the 
Commission. 
In NSW, most draft contracts prohibit research providers from publicly 
releasing results without prior written approval from the Government. A minority of 
draft clauses provide that this approval will not be unreasonably withheld or that the 
Government should ‘be amenable to negotiation regarding appropriate and 
acceptable processes and timing for dissemination’.66 In some cases, non-disclosure 
is accomplished by defining as confidential any material created or written for the 
project and requiring the provider to keep secret any confidential information both 
during and after the term of the contract.  
University-based providers seem more likely to negotiate over restrictions on 
publication. Some final contracts reveal compromises; for example, instead of 
requiring formal written approval for any publication or presentation, the provider 
must instead submit a manuscript or abstract to the government for ‘review and 
comments’.67 What happens next varies. The researcher may be contractually bound 
to modify or delete any information the government ‘reasonably believes will harm, 
prejudice or in any other way injure [its] interests’68 or to ‘consider but [not be] 
obliged to follow’69 the comments. 
																																																								
61 Commonwealth contract with a university (2007).  
62 Commonwealth contract with a small private consultancy (2011).  
63 Commonwealth contracts with a university and a small private consultancy (2007).  
64 Commonwealth contract with a university (2008).  
65 Ibid.  
66 This provision appeared in draft NSW Department of Health contracts.  
67 This wording appeared in NSW Department of Health and Department of Education contracts.  
68 NSW Department of Education contract with a university (2012).  
69 NSW Department of Attorney General and Justice contract with a university (2013).  
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Two multi-year and multi-million dollar university research programs funded 
by the NSW Department of Health require 10–15 peer-reviewed publications of 
research findings as project deliverables. However, there are differences in the 
degree of control the government may exert over the public dissemination of 
findings. One contract requires the university to submit an ‘unabridged version’ of 
‘any presentation, abstract, journal article, media material, conference paper or 
similar … to the Ministry no less than 30 business days prior to the proposed due 
date.’70 The Ministry then has the option to either approve the material for public 
release or 
on a reasonable basis, reject the Publication in writing, in which case the 
contractor must omit the content identified … as unacceptable from the 
Publication, provided that this rejection may not be exercised by the Ministry 
after a period of 18 months has elapsed following provision of the final 
reports, issues papers and other deliverables under this Agreement.71 
The other contract provides that the research team ‘has the right to publish findings 
of their research’,72 but must submit draft publications to the government for review 
and comment, then ‘incorporate feedback’73 into the final versions. Both contracts 
include a schedule that details the review process for publications and reports. For 
articles submitted to scholarly journals, the Ministry must approve any substantial 
revisions requested during the peer review process. The schedule states that a 
‘substantial revision’ includes ‘those that have implications for government 
policy’.74 
Two NSW contracts contain an open access clause:  
All research papers that have been accepted for publication in peer reviewed 
journals, and supported in part or in whole with the Funding, must be 
deposited into an open access institutional repository within a 12 month period 
from the date of publication.75 
Such publications must also bear the disclaimer that the views presented are not 
necessarily those of the Government. 
A few contracts, including those with universities, do not have specific 
provisions on journal publications and state more generally that the research 
provider must only use contract materials with the government’s written approval. 
Since a contract is meant to provide evidence of a ‘meeting of the minds’ of the 
parties to the agreement, it would be better practice to specify the publication terms 
in the contract. We argue below that such terms should be consistent with the 
principle of openness and that any restrictions on dissemination should have a strong 
justification. 
																																																								
70 NSW Department of Health contract with a university (2013).  
71 Ibid.  
72 This was a NSW Department of Health contract with a university (2013).  
73 Ibid.  
74 NSW Department of Health contracts with universities (2013).  
75 NSW Department of Health contracts with a university (2011) and a medical research institute (2011). 
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One NSW Department made contracts with seven different research 
providers (six were universities) to undertake work on a common project.76 
Interestingly, the draft contract issued to all bidders required the Government’s prior 
written approval to publish research results, but this clause was absent from all the 
final agreements, suggesting a common concern among the research providers with 
limiting government control over dissemination. 
C Implications 
The findings of our contracts analysis have troubling implications. The routine use 
of control clauses is at odds with government pledges to be more transparent, provide 
open access to information, and enable the public to be meaningfully engaged in 
policy debates and decisions. The ideal of evidence-based policymaking is also 
compromised. As the Productivity Commission Chair has asked: ‘Can data and 
analysis that are not able to be scrutinised by third parties really be called 
“evidence”?’77 The influence of ideology and politics on the production and use of 
evidence is hidden when governments have the power to control external researchers 
and the outcomes of their work. Moreover, academic freedom, central to 
universities’ mission to advance and disseminate knowledge informed by free 
inquiry, is undermined when university-based researchers face restrictions on 
publication. We turn now to recommendations to improve contracting processes and 
provisions to ensure that government commitments to transparency are realised in 
practice. 
IV Recommendations to Improve Transparency  
In a consultation document for its First Open Government National Action Plan, the 
Commonwealth claims to have a ‘long, proud history’ of openness, but 
acknowledges it ‘needs to become even more open, transparent and accountable, and 
improve public engagement.’78 The National Action Plan’s commitments include 
improving ‘the discoverability and accessibility of government data and 
information’ and enhancing ‘public participation in government decision making’.79 
Australian states also champion the benefits of openness. According to the NSW 
Government, ‘[a] smart government is transparent and accountable, and understands 
that solutions to policy challenges can come from outside government.’80 
Despite these public commitments, the starting point for most of the contracts 
we reviewed is a substantial degree of government control that may only be 
																																																								
76 These were NSW Department of Family and Community Service contracts with universities and a 
non-governmental organisation (2014).  
77 Productivity Commission (Cth), above n 23 vol 1, 9. 
78 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), Australia’s First Open Government National 
Action Plan 2016–18: Draft for Consultation (2016) 3 <https://ogpau.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/ 
files/2016/10/Australias-first-Open-Government-National-Action-Plan-Draft-for-consultation-
Accessible.pdf>. 
79 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), above n 5, 41, 59. 
80 NSW Government, Open Data Policy (2016) <https://www.digital.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/ 
NSW_Government_Open_Data_Policy_2016.pdf>. 
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diminished through negotiation that depends on the skills and values of the external 
researchers and their legal representatives (and, of course, on the willingness of the 
government representative to relinquish control). Our findings underscore the 
importance of scrutinising government practices and we call on all federal, state and 
territorial governments to review their procurement practices and pro forma 
contracts to ensure they advance the principles of openness and transparency. 
Transparency in government contracting for research raises several key 
questions, including:  
(1) To whom are government contracts awarded?  
(2) What are the terms of the contractual relationship between the government 
purchaser and the external provider of research services? and 
(3) Are the findings of government-purchased research reported publicly? 
A To Whom are Government Contracts Awarded? 
Reforms have been made to mandate transparency in the awarding of contracts, 
which is important to root out cronyism and other corrupt practices.81 The 
Commonwealth Procurement Rules require that Australian Government entities 
‘enable appropriate scrutiny of their procurement activity’82 and require that tender 
awards above reporting thresholds be disclosed on the AusTender website.83 In 
NSW, the GIPA Act requires a public register of government contracts over 
$150 00084 and similar registers exist in other states and territories (with variation in 
the dollar value of disclosed contracts).85 This compulsory disclosure, however, only 
covers basic details such as the name of the entity awarded the contract, the contract 
value, and the contract duration.86 And, as noted earlier, audits of the AusTender 
website reveal dismal compliance with reporting requirements. 
B What Are the Terms of the Contractual Relationship? 
1 Disclosure of Full Contract Details 
To achieve an even greater degree of openness, we agree with Transparency 
International Australia that the ‘[f]ull details of awarded contracts should be 
																																																								
81 LobbyLens is an online tool that integrates Commonwealth Lobbyists Register Data with contract 
notices data from AusTender: LobbyLens, About LobbyLens <http://lobbyists.disclosurelo.gs/ 
about.php>. 
82 Department of Finance (Cth), Commonwealth Procurement Rules (March 2017) 15 [7.1] 
<https://www.finance.gov.au/sites/default/files/commonwealth-procurement-rules.pdf>.  
83 Ibid 17 [7.16]–[7.17]. The reporting thresholds are $10 000 for non-corporate Commonwealth 
entities and $400 000 for prescribed corporate Commonwealth entities. A $7.5 million threshold 
applies for construction service contracts. 
84 GIPA Act pt 3 div 5 (‘Government contracts with private sector’). 
85 See, eg, Tenders VIC, Contracts <https://www.tenders.vic.gov.au/tenders/contract/list.do?action= 
contract-view>; Department of Corporate and Information Services (NT), Northern Territory 
Government — Awarded Government Contracts (1 August 2018) <https://nt.gov.au/__data/assets/ 
pdf_file/0009/382977/government-awarded-contracts.pdf>. 
86 GIPA Act s 29 lists the details that the contract register must include. 
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disclosed’.87 We argue for proactive transparency, which could easily be 
accomplished by posting the contract on tender websites, alongside the contract 
award notice. Members of the public could then see to whom the contract has been 
awarded, as well as the full terms of the relationship between the government 
purchaser and the external provider. Importantly, this would enable public scrutiny 
of control clauses and governments could be held to account for contractual terms 
that allow them to control the conduct and dissemination of research. Proactive 
transparency would obviate the need for interested parties — such as the present 
authors — to make FOI requests for contracts and save government departments the 
costs of processing these requests. 
Our recommendation is not radical since the Commonwealth Procurement 
Rules already express a general presumption that the terms of a contract are not 
confidential: ‘once a contract has been awarded the terms of the contract, including 
parts of the contract drawn from the supplier’s submission, are not confidential’.88 
An exception applies to details that come within the scope of the government’s 
procurement confidentiality principles, which state that contractual terms may be 
considered confidential if they deal with ‘sensitive security information’ or ‘the 
contract is for a consultant to prepare a confidential report which is expected to deal 
with sensitive public interest issues’.89 No further elaboration is provided as to what 
counts as such sensitive issues, however governments should not apply exceptions 
to public disclosure in a manner that is inconsistent with principles of openness.90 In 
any case, clauses that set out the terms related to publication, IP and termination do 
not, in themselves, reveal sensitive information and should not be caught by these 
exceptions. 
2 The Substantive Content of Contractual Terms 
To advance the goals of transparency, governments should ensure that the contract 
terms do not exert an unnecessary degree of control over external research providers. 
Therefore, in addition to advocating for the full disclosure of contracts on public 
registers, we also recommend that governments, in consultation with stakeholders, 
review the terms in their standard form contracts and update these pro formas where 
necessary to advance transparency goals.91 Representatives of the university sector, 
including researchers who have experience performing contract research, are key 
stakeholders. It is imperative that contractual relationships formed between 
government and university-based researchers do not undermine the public values 
																																																								
87 Transparency International Australia, Transparency in Public Procurement (Position Paper No 6, 
(January 2016) 2 <http://transparency.org.au/tia/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/PP6-Transparency-in-
Public-Procurement-Transparency-International-Australia-Jan-2016.pdf>. 
88 Department of Finance (Cth), above n 79, 18 [7.21] (subject to some exceptions listed in that 
paragraph). 
89 Department of Finance (Cth), Confidentiality throughout the Procurement Cycle (10 July 2014) 
principle 7 <http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/procurement-policy-and-guidance/buying/ 
contract-issues/confidentiality-procurement-cycle/principles.html>.  
90 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Cth), above n 1. 
91 We acknowledge that pro formas need to offer options to take account of interests of the contracting 
parties that arise in different circumstances. 
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expressed in the Acts of Parliament that establish Australian universities92 and 
diminish trust in and respect for universities as institutions with a unique and 
important role in society.93 University-based researchers who believe that contract 
research compromises their academic freedom may choose to avoid such work. This 
would be an undesirable outcome as ‘it is clearly not in government’s interest, or in 
the public interest, if there is a narrowing pool of people who are willing to work on 
government contracts.’94 
It is beyond the scope of this article to propose a standard form for contract 
research, but we synthesise here several core transparency principles and 
recommendations pertinent to the three types of control clauses we examined in 
Commonwealth and NSW contracts. 
(a) Termination Clauses 
Termination-for-convenience clauses give government purchasers a broad power to 
end contracts at their discretion. The Australian Government has recently sought to 
streamline contracts for under $200 000 by establishing a core set of contractual 
terms, including a termination for convenience clause. The Government adopts a 
rigid stance in warning that these terms ‘cannot be changed and are non-
negotiable’.95 The convenience for government must be weighed against the 
potential downsides for external researchers who face challenges in establishing 
research teams and managing resources when they lack certainty about the funding 
commitment.96 If government seeks the benefit of termination for convenience, the 
contract ought to explicitly incorporate a good faith requirement to prevent the 
unreasonable exercise of this power based on capricious or ulterior motives.97 For 
higher value contracts to fund multi-year research projects, it may be unreasonable 
to expect external researchers to undertake such work with the risk that the contract 
may be ended solely at the government’s discretion. Termination-for-cause 
provisions would meet governments’ interests in ensuring the work progresses in 
accordance with an agreed plan and schedule. 
	  
																																																								
92 See above n 29.  
93 This point was emphasised by the Go8, above n 39, 2: ‘Public universities occupy a unique place in 
society. … [yet the] important function and role of universities is often not recognised by 
government[s] … when they seek to commission research at Australian universities.’  
94 Sedley Report, above n 2, 8 [2.18]. 
95 Department of Finance (Cth) Commonwealth Contracting Suite (CCS) (21 August 2018) 
<http://www.finance.gov.au/procurement/commonwealth-contracting-suite/> (emphasis in original). 
96 The Go8 also noted these problems: above n 39, 10 [6.3]. See also the G08 recommendation at  
10 [6.1].  
97 There is debate in Australian jurisprudence as to the meaning of a good faith provision in termination-
for-convenience clauses. It likely implies a duty to act reasonably when invoking the clause (see, eg, 
Renard Constructions (ME) Pty Ltd v Minister for Public Works (1992) 26 NSWLR 234) and not to 
act capriciously based on an ulterior or extraneous motive (see, eg, Sundararajah v Teachers 
Federation Health Ltd [2009] NSWSC 1443 (18 December 2009)). 
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(b) Intellectual Property 
Contractual terms governing the handling of IP shape whether and how research 
findings are publicly disseminated and used. Various recommendations have been 
put forward for dealing with IP in the context of government-purchased research and 
public sector information. Internationally, the OECD acknowledges that ‘[t]here is 
a wide range of ways to deal with copyrights on public sector information’ and 
encourages ‘institutions and government agencies that fund works from outside 
sources to find ways to make these works widely accessible to the public’.98 The 
2009 Government 2.0 Taskforce Report recommended that ‘[n]ew contracts or 
agreements with a third party should endeavour to include a clause clearly stating 
the Commonwealth’s obligation to publish relevant data’ using Creative Commons 
licensing.99 
In September 2016, the Australian Government released new Intellectual 
Property Principles for Commonwealth Entities (‘IP Principles’) and Guidelines on 
Licensing Public Sector Information for Australian Government Entities.100 The IP 
Principles state that, in their approaches to the ownership, management and use of 
IP, Commonwealth entities should advance the policy objectives that underpin 
Government 2.0, which includes open access and the flow of information within and 
beyond government. In regard to public sector information, entities ‘should 
encourage public use and easy access to material’ particularly to meet the goals of 
informing the public on government activities and policies.101 Creative Commons 
licences are recommended to promote the free and open use of public sector 
information. 
The Guidelines on Licensing mark a policy shift away from the standard 
practice of the Commonwealth asserting copyright on publications,102 which was the 
default we observed in many of the contracts in our study. Instead, the new 
guidelines advocate open access of public sector information and state that the 
‘author entity … is best placed to determine the use that others may make of it’.103 
From the university perspective, the Go8 has argued that universities should own 
new IP developed during the course of contract research as they are best positioned 
to ensure public dissemination.104 
																																																								
98 OECD, above n 19, 6. 
99 Government 2.0 Taskforce Report, above n 17, xix [6.6]. For more information on Creative Commons 
licensing, see Creative Commons Australia, About the Licences <http://creativecommons.org.au/ 
learn/licences/>. 
100 Department of Communications and the Arts (Cth), Australian Government Intellectual Property Rules 
(10 July 2018) <https://www.communications.gov.au/policy/policy-listing/australian-government-
intellectual-property-rules>. 
101 Department of Communications and the Arts (Cth), Intellectual Property Principles for 
Commonwealth Entities (10 July 2018) 8 [11(a)] <https://www.communications.gov.au/policy/ 
policy-listing/australian-government-intellectual-property-rules>. 
102 Department of Communications and the Arts (Cth), Guidelines on Licensing Public Sector 
Information for Australian Government Entities (10 July 2018) 5 <https://www.communications. 
gov.au/policy/policy-listing/australian-government-intellectual-property-rules>. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Go8, above n 39, 3 (principle 2). 
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C  Publication of Results 
Contracts should not empower governments to sanitise or supress the results of 
externally commissioned research. The publication and dissemination of research 
findings should be a key goal of contracts between government purchasers of 
research and the external researchers who provide their expertise. For university-
based researchers in particular, the contractual relationship should respect and 
support the principle that ‘the right to publish the results of all research in a timely 
manner is a critical tenet of the concept of academic freedom and of the integrity of 
the research process’.105 A consultative process of review and feedback between the 
government purchaser and the researcher may well help improve the accuracy and 
quality of presentations and publications, but the government should not wield veto 
power over public dissemination. 
The recommendations of the Sedley Report in the UK provide an exemplar 
for Australian governments by urging that research contracts make a clear 
commitment to the publication of results, recognising that ‘prompt and full 
publication of government research is the norm’.106 This is especially important for 
Australia as a participant in the Open Government Partnership. We elaborate below 
on a proposal for a public register of contract research reports. This is not a radical 
suggestion, but rather a logical progression in steps toward enhancing open 
government that include Australian governments’ current initiatives to provide open 
access public sector datasets and to publish the results of program evaluations. 
1 The Open Data Movement 
In its current Open Government Action Plan, the Australian Government pledges to 
increase the availability of public data to support research and data driven decision-
making and problem solving.107 This commitment follows the release of a Public 
Data Policy Statement in December 2015 in which the Government promises ‘to 
optimise the use and reuse of public data’ and ‘to release non sensitive data as open 
by default’.108 Furthermore, government entities will ‘where possible, ensure 
non-sensitive publicly funded research data is made open for use and reuse’.109 
These statements are promising, but two important shortcomings are evident. 
First, the government websites dedicated to publishing datasets currently have 
meagre content. As of July 2017, 20 healthcare datasets were available on 
data.gov.au,110 covering disparate topics such as: statistics on health behaviours of 
																																																								
105 Ibid 5 [1.4]. Schneider, Milat and Moore add that ‘allowing adequate academic freedom and openness 
to publication can act as facilitators and increase high quality evaluation research’: above n 9, 214. 
106 Sedley Report, above n 2, 35 (recommendation III). 
107 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), above n 5, 25. 
108 Australian Government, Australian Government Public Data Policy Statement (7 December 2015) 
<https://www.pmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/aust_govt_public_data_policy_statement_
1.pdf>. 
109 Ibid (emphasis altered). 
110 See Australian Government, About <http://data.gov.au/about>. The site is intended to provide ‘an 
easy way to find, access and reuse public datasets from Government. The main purpose of the site is 
to encourage public access to and reuse of public data.’  
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NSW residents111; a database of the location of European wasp nests in the 
Australian Capital Territory (‘ACT’);112 and a list of venues for yoga, pilates and tai 
chi classes in Victoria.113  
Second, it is important to note that data are distinguished from information: 
‘data comprises raw, unorganised material’, while information is produced from data 
that has been ‘processed and presented in context’.114 Release of datasets is valuable 
but the Australian Government’s Open Government National Action Plan also 
promises to improve access to information. 
If governments release data, then interpretations of data — ‘information’ — 
that inform their policy and program development and public spending decisions, 
ought also to be available. The analyses and interpretations of data should be subject 
to scrutiny and critique if the conclusions or recommendations made do not follow 
from the data or if data appear to have been manipulated to reach politically 
expedient decisions. Further, if governments are committed to public disclosure of 
research datasets, then externally commissioned researchers will presumably collect 
data (for example, responses to a survey) on the understanding that the dataset will 
be made publicly available. Why then should they be expected to work under 
contractual terms that permit the non-disclosure of research findings (for example, 
the report that analyses the survey results in the context of a relevant government 
policy or program)? 
Moreover, releasing data while suppressing information can undermine 
democratic participation and worsen informational inequities: 
Without the skills and knowledge to interpret the vast amount of datasets 
thrown at them, or any context surrounding the data, many citizens will not 
be able to make sense of these data. They will not benefit from OGD [open 
government data] and, hence, they will not have full access to the information 
that can be extracted from these data.  
Hence, it will be highly unlikely that the benefits of OGD for transparency, 
accountability and public participation will actually materialise in this setting. 
On the contrary, OGD may actually reinforce or enlarge existing inequalities 
in access to information — the distinction between the information-haves and 
the information-have-nots … — and create an elite that can make use of the 
available datasets and that will hold an important power over other citizens.115 
	  
																																																								
111 The Health Behaviours in NSW dataset provides data on the ‘[p]roportion of NSW population over 
[the] age of 16 that; smoke, engage in risk drinking, are considered overweight or obese.’: Australian 
Government, Health Behaviours in NSW (12 May 2013) <http://data.gov.au/dataset/health-
behaviours-in-nsw>. 
112 Australian Government, Location of European Wasps Nests (ACT) (7 March 2015) 
<http://data.gov.au/dataset/location-of-european-wasps-nests>. 
113 Australian Government, Yoga, Pilates and Tai Chi in Victoria — GFYL (7 March 2015) 
<http://data.gov.au/dataset/yoga-pilates-and-tai-chi-in-victoria-gfyl>. 
114 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (Cth), above n 5, 25 n 2. 
115 Katleen Janssen, ‘Open Government Data and the Right to Information: Opportunities and Obstacles’ 
(2012) 8(2) Journal of Community Informatics <http://www.ci-journal.net/index.php/ciej/article/ 
view/952/954> (citations omitted).  
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2 Reporting of Program Evaluations 
Some Australian governments are taking steps to adopt transparency in program 
evaluation by endorsing the publication of program evaluation reports.116 This marks 
some progress toward a 2009 Productivity Commission recommendation for ‘[a] 
national repository of evaluation reports … [to] improve the level of scrutiny and 
increase the range of evidence available.’117 In 2016, the NSW Government adopted 
new Program Evaluation Guidelines that set a general rule that agencies must 
‘proactively and publicly release the findings of program evaluations.’118 The 2010 
ACT Evaluation Policy and Guidelines state that the ‘[c]ommunication of evaluation 
results helps disseminate key lessons and experience, informs decision making and 
promotes transparency and accountability’.119 However, the Guidelines imply that 
communication in many cases will only be internal within government and only the 
results of ‘significant evaluations [should be] publically [sic] available’.120 The 
Queensland Program Evaluation Guidelines emphasise the importance of ‘clear, 
transparent reporting’ of key findings, but do not currently require public disclosure 
of all evaluations.121 The Guidelines are, however, meant to align with the 
Government’s overall Performance Management Framework, which asserts that 
‘[p]ublishing performance information is essential for accountability, transparency, 
driving continuous improvement in performance, and influencing trust and 
confidence in public sector service delivery.’122 
We go further and recommend that all externally purchased research, not just 




116 For links to several government policy statements on program evaluation, see WA Government, 
Program Evaluation across Australia (28 March 2014) <http://programevaluation.wa.gov.au/ 
About/News/Program-Evaluation-Across-Australia>. 
117 Productivity Commission, above n 23, vol 1, 207. 
118 Department of Premier and Cabinet (NSW), NSW Government Program Evaluation Guidelines 
(January 2016) 16 <https://arp.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/files/NSW%20Government%20Program% 
20Evaluation%20Guideline%20January%202016_1.pdf>. This policy defines program evaluation as 
a ‘rigorous, systematic and objective process to assess a program’s effectiveness, efficiency, 
appropriateness and sustainability’: at 5. 
119 ACT Government, Evaluation Policy and Guidelines (December 2010) 14 <http://www.cmd.act. 
gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/175432/ACT-Evaluation-Policy-Guidelines.pdf>. 
120 Ibid 8. The significance of an evaluation is determined by an ‘assessment of materiality, risk and 
complexity’.  
121 Queensland Treasury and Trade (Qld), Program Evaluation Guidelines (November 2014) 7 
<https://s3.treasury.qld.gov.au/files/qld-government-program-evaluation-guidelines.pdf>. At page 
12, the Guidelines state that ‘reporting requirements will depend on the objectives of the evaluation 
and the intended audience’. 
122 Department of the Premier and Cabinet (Qld), Queensland Government Performance Management 
Framework: An Overview (2017) 15 <https://www.forgov.qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/performance 
-management-framework.pdf>. 
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3 Public Repository of the Results of Contract Research 
In the UK, the Sedley Report recommended ‘[a] standardised central register of all 
externally commissioned government research.’123 We endorse this approach for 
Australia since it most strongly advances proactive transparency. As the Australian 
Information Commissioner has pointed out: ‘Communicating information to the 
public is a major tool and activity of government. It is how government reports what 
it is doing … shares research … and facilitates public participation in government 
decision making and priority setting.’124 
Reports could be identified by the original tender identification number, with 
links to the materials archived on tender websites, such as the approach to market 
and contract documents. This reporting would be separate from the publication of 
scholarly works in peer-reviewed academic journals. In exceptional circumstances, 
reports may justifiably be withheld from publication on compelling privacy or 
security grounds, but the existence of the report should be noted in the register along 
with the basis on which it is being withheld. This is consistent with the Productivity 
Commission’s recent recommendation that ‘[p]ublicly funded entities, including all 
Australian Government agencies, should create comprehensive, easy to access 
registers of data … that they fund or hold.’125 
We anticipate several objections to this recommendation, primarily from 
government officials.126 First, governments will fret about ‘how information might 
be “spun” by the media, their opponents or those with direct commercial interests or 
an axe to grind.’127 These concerns, while genuinely held and understandable, are 
not legitimate reasons for withholding externally commissioned research results 
from public view. FOI laws make it clear that the prospect of being embarrassed 
does not alone justify withholding government-held information from the public.128 
With effective communication, governments can help the media and public 
understand research results and explain how ‘negative’ findings are important to 
evidence-informed policy and program decisions.129 Governments that publish 
																																																								
123 Sedley Report, above n 2, 34 (recommendation I). The Report goes on further to call for the ‘[r]outine 
publication of research government has considered in policy formulation with, if appropriate, reasons 
for rejecting it.’: at 36 (recommendation IV).  
124 Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (Cth), above n 1, 1. Transparency International 
Australia also advocates that ‘details of completion of the contract should be published in a timely 
manner’ and we believe such details include the research findings: above n 84, 2. 
125 Productivity Commission, above n 10, 243 (Recommendation 6.4). This recommendation continues: 
‘Where datasets are held or funded but are not available for access or release, the register should 
indicate this and the reasons why this is so.’ 
126 European scholars have conducted interviews with public sector officials and data archivists to 
explore the pros and cons of proactive release of government information: see Anneke Zuiderwijk 
and Marijn Janssen, ‘Towards Decision Support for Disclosing Data: Closed or Open Data?’ (2015) 
20 (2) Information Polity 103.  
127 Government 2.0 Taskforce Report, above n 17, 50 [5.6.2]. 
128 For example, the GIPA Act s 15(c) states that in determining access requests, ‘[t]he fact that 
disclosure of information might cause embarrassment to, or a loss of confidence in, the Government 
is irrelevant and must not be taken into account.’ 
129 On the publication of ‘negative’ results as a component of credible and balanced performance reporting, 
see Department of the Premier and Cabinet (Qld), Performance Management Framework — Measuring, 
Monitoring and Reporting Performance: Reference Guide (2017) 16 (citation omitted) 
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program evaluation reports will have experience with this type of communication. 
We also emphasise that proactive disclosure on a public register would apply only 
to externally commissioned research. Internal research and policy advice from 
bureaucrats would not be included, thus freeing them to provide the ‘frank and 
fearless’ advice that Ministers seek.130 
Second, the costs and administrative burdens of maintaining another public 
register may be a concern. However, governments are now well experienced in 
designing and running other centralised databases, including the AusTender website 
and data.gov.au, and a similar database should not demand novel information 
technology expertise and platforms. Improving proactive disclosure could also 
reduce the costs of processing FOI requests.131 
Third, a requirement to publish the results of externally commissioned 
research may create an incentive for governments to exert greater control over the 
design and conduct of the research to produce results that cast them in a flattering 
light.132 However, reports should provide a convincing rationale for the formulation 
of the research questions, design and methods to counter such manipulation. The 
knowledge that reports will be open to external scrutiny would also militate against 
designing studies that are obviously contrived to produce favourable results. 
V An Agenda for Further Research  
Our investigation of Commonwealth and NSW contracts has started to answer the 
question of what types of control clauses are present in government contracts and to 
propose reform options to advance transparency in externally purchased research. 
One limitation of our documentary analysis of contracts is that it was a pilot study 
with a small sample of tenders for health-related research and we cannot draw 
conclusions about the prevalence of control clauses across all types of research 
contracts. However, control clauses were prevalent in the contracts we accessed and 
it is reasonable to assume that they exist in other contracts. It would be enlightening 
to undertake a study of contracts for research in other areas of contemporary policy 
controversy, such as environmental and climate science issues. 
																																																								
<https://www.forgov.qld.gov.au/sites/default/files/measuring-monitoring-reporting-performance.pdf>. 
The Government 2.0 Taskforce Report urged that ‘[o]fficials should be able to express themselves 
informally, tentatively and candidly but they must also do so in ways that retain people’s confidence 
that they are acting fairly, professionally and impartially.’: above 17, 20 [3.3]. The Sedley Report 
noted ‘strategies that can help government to commission and publish controversial research without 
fear of how the public or the media might respond’: above n 2, 31 [4.1]. 
130 Henry Belot, ‘Australia’s Top Public Servants Call for FOI Reform to Hide Advice from Public’, 
The Canberra Times (online) 11 April 2016 <http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-
service/australias-top-public-servants-call-for-foi-reform-to-hide-advice-from-public-20160411-
go3gxt.html>. 
131 Some government departments complain of the cost of managing FOI requests, claiming that many 
requests are from journalists looking for stories. Proactive disclosure could divert at least some of 
those requests as journalists could search through the public repository to report on research results. 
High-quality journalistic reporting can only serve to inform the public of government activities and 
enhance accountability. 
132 Schneider, Milat and Moore reported some evidence that this already happens: above n 9, 211. 
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Further studies are needed to explore: the factors that contribute to the use of 
such clauses; the experiences of government purchasers and external providers in 
contract negotiations; the conduct of research that is subject to control clauses; and 
the broader transparency and accountability implications in this context. Research is 
needed to investigate the extent to which governments invoke control clauses, 
especially to suppress the publication of research and to sanitise results and shape 
the messages that communicate research findings when they are publicised. It would 
be worthwhile to follow up on Yazahmeidi and Holman’s survey of Australian 
researchers about their experiences of ‘suppression events’ when doing contract 
research.133 This survey is now over 10 years old and Australian governments have 
since made commitments to improve transparency and access to public sector 
information. Have researchers’ experiences of suppression decreased or increased? 
Do formal transparency requirements, such as obligations to post basic contract 
information online, lead to greater reliance on clauses within contracts to protect the 
results from disclosure? The Government 2.0 Report hypothesised that professional 
advisors to government managers and decision-makers, including legal and 
communications professionals, are generally risk averse and ‘see maximisation of 
control as a default setting.’134 The attitudes and practices of these advisors are 
important areas for investigation. 
Future study should also examine the types of external entities that provide 
research and advice to governments and identify any differences that arise depending 
on the provider type, such as university-based researchers, research business spin-
offs from universities, or private sector think tanks and consultancies. Such work 
could investigate how governments construct research briefs and whether they vary 
for different types of providers. While our analysis focused on contractual control 
clauses, it is important to note that governments can also exert significant control 
over research by specifying the design and methods that external providers must use. 
A recent Australian study interviewed policymakers and researchers involved in 
evaluations of health programs and policies. The authors learned that ‘[i]n many 
cases, evaluations are undertaken specifically to demonstrate positive results and 
participants reported that briefs for external evaluators were written in a way that 
implies a certain result is expected.’135 
As a related question, it is worth exploring how governments view the 
credibility and legitimacy of different research providers. A recent study by 
Doberstein observed that ‘[a]cademics have historically occupied a privileged 
position of authority and legitimacy in the public domain as it relates to policy 
research, but some argue that this is changing with the growth of think tanks and 
																																																								
133 Yazahmeidi and Holman, above n 35. 
134 Government 2.0 Taskforce Report, above n 17, 51 [5.6.2.1]:  
it is natural for managers seeking to minimise adverse risk to try to control whatever they can. 
… [And] specific professions advising management, such as the provision of legal, 
communications or IT advice and services will typically see maximisation of control as a default 
setting to minimise adverse risks. … one cannot be sure that it [information] will not be used or 
misused in ways that may embarrass an agency. So why release it if one can avoid it? 
135 Schneider, Milat and Moore, above n 9, 211. 
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research-based advocacy groups.’136 Doberstein recommended critical investigation 
of the ‘competition of ideas and for influence, as the magnitude and sophistication 
of non-university-derived research and policy advice continues to grow’.137 Scholars 
have observed a trend to an increased politicisation of research and policy advice 
provided by external think tanks and consultants.138 Some research suggests that 
private sector consultants are ‘often seen as more likely to report positively on 
policies and programs, in a way that is less of a risk’ for the government purchasing 
the research.139 Further investigation is needed to find out whether private 
consultants provide skewed results. If universities insist on academic freedom and 
more transparency in contract research, governments may respond by engaging 
private consultants who are perceived as more compliant than academics. 
Competition for funding and pressure to do research that has ‘impact’ on government 
policies and program may also persuade university-based researchers to accept briefs 
that are designed to produce results favourable to the government purchaser. 
Schneider and colleagues have recently commented on these types of political 
influences in the context of evaluation research: 
Political imperatives not only influenced if, when and with what funding a 
policy or program might be evaluated, but indirectly determined the focus of 
evaluations. For example, there may be a preference for measuring cost-utility 
rather than population health outcomes. In some situations, it may be more 
important to be immediately seen to be ‘doing something’ rather than having 
an actual effect.140 
In short, the politics and practices of participants and stakeholders in externally 
purchased research are ripe for legal, ethical and socio-cultural investigation. 
VI Conclusion 
In 2013, the Office of the Chief Scientist surveyed over 1000 Australians across the 
country, asking their views on the most pressing issues that science should address. 
This project culminated in an essay collection, titled The Curious Country, featuring 
expert commentary on those issues.141 The introduction to the volume declared that 
it is vital that well-trained minds wield the tools of scientific inquiry. … the 
most effective way to enhance Australia’s social, economic, physical and 
intellectual wellbeing is to sort truth from fantasy, attainable dreams from 
wild conjecture and apply the findings to evidence-based national, regional 
and local government policy…142 
																																																								
136 Carey Doberstein, ‘Whom Do Bureaucrats Believe? A Randomized Controlled Experiment Testing 
Perceptions of Credibility of Policy Research’ (2017) 45(2) Policy Studies Journal 384, 375 
<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/psj.12166> (citations omitted). 
137 Ibid (emphasis altered; citations omitted). 
138 Vromen and Hurley, above n 7; Jonathan Craft and Michael Howlett, ‘The Dual Dynamics of Policy 
Advisory Systems: The Impact of Externalization and Politicization on Policy Advice’ (2013) 32(3) 
Policy and Society 187 <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.07.001>; Veselý, above n 7. 
139 Schneider, Milat and Moore, above n 9, 211. 
140 Ibid. 
141 Leigh Dayton (ed), The Curious Country (ANU Press, 2013) <http://press.anu.edu.au/node/159/ 
download>. 
142 Ibid 9. 
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The Chief Scientist lamented ‘the increasingly limited information available about 
science and society through mainstream media’ and emphasised the need for 
transparency and openness in research.143 
We applaud the Chief Scientist and other government offices for their 
commitments, at least in principle, to robust scientific inquiry, evidence- informed 
policymaking, public engagement and transparency. However, as we have argued 
here, much more effort and cultural changes are needed to see these principles 
regularly and consistently enacted in practice. 
Stating lofty objectives is not sufficient, and organisational cultures and 
practices must shift to remove attitudinal barriers to transparency. The need for 
culture change is identified in a recent Productivity Commission Report on access 
to public datasets:  
Despite recent statements in favour of greater openness, many areas of 
Australia’s public sector continue to exhibit a reluctance to share or release 
data.  
The entrenched culture of risk aversion … greatly inhibits data discovery, 
analysis and use.144 
By purchasing external research, governments can deliver to the public the 
benefit of accessing independent expertise, technical knowledge, innovative 
methods and ideas, and other resources.145 Governments could be criticised if they 
relied solely on internal perspectives in the design and evaluation of their policies 
and programs. Governments have a corollary obligation to citizens to be open and 
transparent about the research they purchase and to facilitate the public 
dissemination of the findings unless there is strong justification for not doing so. 
Moreover, particularly when making research contracts with universities, 
governments should not undermine the principal function of universities to engage 
in the ‘dissemination, advancement, development and application of knowledge 
informed by free inquiry’.146  
																																																								
143 Ibid. The book offers a brief exposition of the scientific method, then states (at 10): ‘in practice the 
science process is complex. Experiments must be as free as possible from personal bias or error. 
Other scientists must be able to replicate the results.’ 
144 Productivity Commission, above n 10, 34, 153 (Finding 3.5). 
145 A recent audit of evaluations undertaken internally by government health promotion agencies in 
Victoria recommended external collaborations with academic partners to strengthen the quality of 
evaluation projects: Louise J Francis and Ben J Smith, ‘Toward Best Practice in Evaluation: A Study 
of Australian Health Promotion Agencies’ (2015) 16(5) Health Promotion Practice 715, 722. 
146 University of Sydney Act 1989 (NSW) s 6(2)(b). See also above n 29. 
